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1 Introduction
In most countries, part of the banking sector is protected through implicit or explicit
government guarantees. Some of these guarantees, such as deposit insurance, aﬀect
all banks more or less in the same way; others privilege a subset of banks, such as
public banks or large banks that are “too big to fail”. Such asymmetric bail-out
policies are the subject of our study.
Political and academic discussions have focused on the detrimental eﬀects of such
guarantees on the risk-taking behavior of the protected banks. In contrast, the re-
actions of the remaining banks in the banking system have not been dealt with in
the literature. We close this gap by analyzing the competitive eﬀects of govern-
ment bail-out policies on those banks that do not enjoy a public guarantee. An
understanding of other banks’ reactions is indispensable for the judgment of overall
welfare eﬀects of public bail-out policies.
The relevance of such competitive eﬀects can be illustrated with an example from
Japan. Since the 1990s, Japanese private banks’ proﬁtability has been compro-
mised by thin interest margins. These have been attributed to the competition from
government ﬁnancial institutions as well as from (mostly large) banks receiving dis-
guised subsidies.1 In particular, private banks face strong competition from Japan’s
postal savings system, the biggest deposit taker in the world, which beneﬁts from
an explicit government guarantee and tax exemptions and is subject to limited pru-
dential supervision. The extent of welfare losses arising from this type of “unfair
competition” (Fukao, p. 25, 2003b) depends essentially on how smaller private banks
adjust their risk-taking in reaction to shrinking proﬁtability due to the subsidization
of public and larger banks.
The relationship between banks’ proﬁt margins and their risk-taking is one of the
central themes in the literature on competition and stability in the banking sector.
The basic idea is that competition tends to reduce rents in the banking sector. In
reaction, banks increase their asset risk because of the well-known risk-shifting prob-
lem described by Jensen and Meckling (1976). Similarly, public bail-out guarantees
to a subset of banks lead to a reduction of rents at the competitor banks. Hence
there will be a risk-shifting problem at those banks that are not expected to be
bailed out. This eﬀect will be the driving force in our model.
Our starting point is a paper by Allen and Gale (2000, chapter 8.3), in which the
tradeoﬀ between competition and stability is analyzed in a static agency model.2
Because of its clarity and simplicity, the model is well-suited to capture the eﬀect
of the size of rents on banks’ risk-taking behavior. Like Allen and Gale, we model
competition on the liabilities side of banks’ balance sheets in a Cournot fashion.
1See Fukao (2003a,b) and Kashyap (2002) for an extensive overview of these problems. See also
the diagnosis in the Annual Report of the Bank for International Settlements (2002, pp. 133).
2See also Allen and Gale (2004).Banks without Parachutes 2
However, we modify their model by introducing an asymmetric government bail-
out policy: some banks are bailed out with higher probabilities than others. In
contrast to Allen and Gale, who assume full deposit insurance for all banks, depos-
itors care about the risk of banks’ assets and demand default premia in order to be
compensated for expected losses from bank insolvencies.
Moreover, we consider two time structures with diﬀerent patterns of information
revelation:3 In the ﬁrst model, banks are opaque in the sense that depositors cannot
observe risk before setting deposit rates. Hence, default premia are set before deposit
volumes and risk choices are determined.4 In the second model, we reverse the
timing. Depositors can observe their bank’s risk choice and the level of deposits
before setting default premia. We call banks transparent in this case.
Our main result is that the government bail-out policy unambiguously leads to
higher risk-taking at banks that do not enjoy a government guarantee. The reason
is that the subsidization induces the protected bank to expand its deposit volume,
no matter whether banks are opaque or transparent. Since deposit volumes are
strategic substitutes in our model, the competitor banks react by decreasing their
deposit volumes. However, the overall eﬀect on aggregate deposits is positive so that
there is an increase in the deposit rate, depressing the competitor banks’ margins
and inducing them to take higher risks.
Another important result concerns the protected bank’s risk-taking. Contrary to
conventional wisdom, the eﬀect of the guarantee on the protected bank appears to
depend on the transparency in the banking sector. In the model with opaque banks,
the protected bank may have lower incentives to take risks, because the subsidy
increases the bank’s rents.5 With transparent banks, risk-taking unambiguously
increases in the bail-out probability. Here, the argument is similar to that in the
literature discussing excessive risk-taking in the context of unfairly priced deposit
insurance.
The overall eﬀect on welfare is ambiguous. With opaque banks, a government bail-
out policy increases welfare for many parameter constellations ex ante, while welfare
is generally reduced in the model with transparent banks. Hence welfare eﬀects are
much more complicated than suggested by public discussions of government bail-
out policies and depend, among other things, on the information structure in the
banking sector.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 contains a brief review of the related
literature. In section 3, we derive the competitive eﬀects of an asymmetric bail-
out policy for the cases of opaque and transparent banks. In both models, we ﬁrst
analyze the monopoly case and then the oligopoly case, in which banks have diﬀerent
3Matutes and Vives (2000) use similar time structures in their analysis of the tradeoﬀ between
competition and stability.
4This is the time structure chosen by Allen and Gale (2000, chapter 8.3).
5This eﬀect is comparable to that of Keeley (1990) and Allen and Gale (2000, chapter 8).Banks without Parachutes 3
bail-out probabilities. Welfare implications are discussed for each model. Section 4
summarizes our major ﬁndings and discusses some extensions to our model.
2 Related literature
Our paper is related to two strands of literature: ﬁrst, to the extensive literature
on competition and stability in the banking sector; and second, to the literature on
the eﬀects of public bail-out guarantees.
A paper by Keeley (1990) was the ﬁrst of a large number of papers to establish the
trade-oﬀ between competition and stability in the banking sector. In a simple model,
Keeley shows that the reduction of rents through competition exacerbates the risk-
shifting problem at banks caused by limited liability and/or unfairly priced deposit
insurance.6 Hence, the creation of “charter value” (i.e., the present discounted value
of future rents) through restrictions on competition can induce banks to refrain from
overly risky behavior if the expected loss of the charter value is larger than the
expected gains from increased risk-taking.7
The work by Keeley has been extended in a number of ways, with diﬀering con-
clusions about the existence of the presumed tradeoﬀ. Allen and Gale (2000, chap-
ter 8.3) generalize Keeley’s results in a static agency model, conﬁrming the negative
relationship between competition and stability.8 While the tradeoﬀ appears to be
robust to the introduction of product diﬀerentiation,9 it typically breaks down in the
presence of competition in loan markets (and not just deposit markets).10 Dynamic
models yield contradictory results.11
Similar to the theoretical literature, the empirical literature yields ambiguous results
about the trade-oﬀ between competition and stability. Keeley (1990) presents some
evidence for the view that the surge in bank failures in the 1980s in the United
States may be explained by the disappearance of monopoly rents in banking due
to ﬁnancial deregulation. Similarly, the accumulation of systemic banking crises in
developed and developing countries in the past two decades has been attributed to
6This literature review is restricted to the papers most closely related to ours. For more detailed
surveys on the relationship between competition and stability in banking, see Canoy, van Dijk,
Lemmen, de Mooij, and Weigand (2001) and Carletti and Hartmann (2003). Allen and Gale (2004)
provide a useful overview of what type of models tends to yield what type of results regarding the
sign of the relationship between competition and stability.
7For analyses of regulatory responses, see Hellmann, Murdoch, and Stiglitz (2000) and Repullo
(2004).
8This framework will be used as the basis of our analysis.
9See Matutes and Vives (2000) and Cordella and Yeyati (2002).
10See Koskela and Stenbacka (2000), Caminal and Matutes (2002), and Boyd and De Nicol` o
(2004).
11See Hellmann, Murdoch, and Stiglitz (2000), Perotti and Suarez (2002), Repullo (2004), and
Allen and Gale (2000, chapter 8.4).Banks without Parachutes 4
ﬁnancial liberalization, which has also been shown to be accompanied by declining
charter values in banking (see Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1999).12 In contrast,
a recent cross-country study by Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2003) shows that
systemic banking crises are less likely in countries with more concentrated banking
sectors, but more likely in countries with tighter restrictions on entry and banking
activities. These ﬁndings are inconsistent with the “charter value hypothesis”, ac-
cording to which crises should be less likely in the latter case as well. De Nicol` o,
Bartholomew, Zaham, and Zephirin (2003) ﬁnd that the probability of the failure
of the ﬁve largest banks is positively correlated with bank concentration. This also
contradicts the charter value hypothesis.
The second strand of literature related to our paper concerns the eﬀects of public
bail-out guarantees. With respect to public banks, the literature is scarce. The most
important empirical ﬁndings are that government ownership of banks is pervasive
all over the world and that it tends to be associated with poorly operating ﬁnancial
systems and slower growth performance.13 The evidence on the relationship between
the governmental ownership of banks and banking stability is mixed.14
In contrast, there are a fairly large number of papers on the so-called “too-big-
to-fail” (hereafter TBTF) problem. Large banks may be subject to an incentive
problem because the public authorities cannot credibly commit to not supporting
these banks when failure is impending. The eﬀects on risk-taking are similar to the
ones discussed in the deposit insurance literature. In fact, a TBTF policy can be
described as a complete insurance of all deposits and other liabilities at zero costs.
Since Merton (1977), it has been well-known that unfair deposit insurance entails a
risk-shifting problem, similar to the problem arising from limited liability.15 Hence
one may expect that a more concentrated banking sector with TBTF banks entails
higher risk-taking at the largest banks, and thus higher fragility.16 Since a higher
concentration implies less competition, this result is just the opposite of what would
be predicted by the “charter value literature” described above.17 Our paper aims to
resolve this apparent contradiction.
12In a similar vein, Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven, and Levine (2004) ﬁnd that banks’ interest margins
are higher in countries with tighter restrictions on competition in banking.
13See Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001) and Porta, de Silanes, and Shleifer (2002).
14Caprio and Martinez Peria (2000) ﬁnd that government ownership tends to increase bank
fragility. In contrast, Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004) show that there is no robust impact of
government ownership on bank fragility, once one controls for banking regulation and supervisory
practices.
15See Matutes and Vives (1996, 2000) for theoretical analyses of the relationship between deposit
insurance, competition, and bank stability. Empirical evidence for the adverse eﬀects of deposit
insurance on banking stability has been presented by Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002).
16Erlenmaier and Gersbach (2001) show that, in the absence of risk-shifting problems, a TBTF
policy dominates random bail-out schemes in terms of welfare, whereas the random scheme leads
to higher stability.
17The possibility of risk reduction through the commitment to a bail-out policy has also been
noted by Cordella and Yeyati (2003).Banks without Parachutes 5
The TBTF problem also seems to be an empirically relevant phenomenon. Boyd and
Gertler (1994) document a TBTF problem at the largest commercial banks in the
United States in the 1980s. Schnabel (2003, 2004) describes a similar phenomenon
at the so-called “great banks” in Germany at the time of the Great Depression.
The episode studied most intensively is the near-failure of Continental Illinois in
1984 and the consequent public announcement by regulators that the 11 largest US
banks were too big to be allowed to fail. In an event study, O’Hara and Shaw (1990)
ﬁnd signiﬁcant positive abnormal returns for TBTF banks after the announcement,
which is consistent with the existence of a positive subsidy to TBTF banks. Studies
using bond market data tend to conﬁrm the existence of conjectural government
guarantees.18
Another strand of the empirical literature looks at the question whether the prospect
of becoming TBTF is a motivation for bank mergers.19 While Benston, Hunter, and
Wall (1995) reject this hypothesis for the years 1981 to 1986, the evidence for the
1990s in Kane (2000) and Penas and Unal (2001) is consistent with the hypothesis.
The main diﬀerence between bail-out policies and deposit insurance is that the
former aﬀect diﬀerent banks asymmetrically if bailout probabilities diﬀer across
banks. This asymmetry has not been modeled explicitly in the existing literature.
For example, there is no literature on the impact of a TBTF policy on smaller banks.
O’Hara and Shaw (1990) ﬁnd negative eﬀects on banks not included in the list of
banks deemed to be “too big to fail” and attribute this ﬁnding to the self-ﬁnancing
character of the deposit insurance system. Apart from this ﬁnding, we were not
able to ﬁnd any theoretical or empirical paper dealing with the banks that are “too
small to be saved”. Our paper contributes to closing this gap.
3 The model
The basic setup of our model is similar to the one in Allen and Gale (2000, chap-
ter 8.3). We consider an economy with n chartered banks, indexed by i =1 ,...,n.
Bank i collects deposits di and invests them in risky projects. Projects yield per
invested unit a return yi with probability p(yi), otherwise they return zero. The
success probability is a decreasing and concave function of the target return, i.e.
p (yi) < 0, and p  (yi) ≤ 0. Each bank can choose the “risk level” of its investment
by ﬁxing yi. The aggregate amount of deposits in the economy is D =
n
i=1 di.D e -
positors demand an expected return R(D), with R (D) > 0a n dR  (D) ≥ 0. Banks
and depositors are assumed to be risk neutral.
So far the model is identical to the one by Allen and Gale (2000, chapter 8.3).
However, Allen and Gale assume that deposits are fully insured, so that depositors
18See Flannery and Sorescu (1996) and Morgan and Stiroh (2002).
19This argument is similar to the dynamic arguments in the literature on competition and sta-
bility. It was ﬁrst stated by Hunter and Wall (1989) and Boyd and Graham (1991).Banks without Parachutes 6
do not need to care about default probabilities. In contrast, we assume that bank i is
bailed out by the government with probability βi ∈ [0; 1] in the case of failure.20 The
government can commit itself to this exogenous bail-out probability.21 Given this,
depositors are repaid with probability p(yi)+βi (1 − p(yi)), while with probability
(1 − βi)(1− p(yi)), they receive nothing. In order to obtain an expected return
of R(D), they demand a nominal return of ρi R(D); the “default premium” ρi will
depend on βi and yi.
The expected proﬁt of bank i consists of three factors: the probability of success
p(yi), the deposit volume di, and some “margin” given by the diﬀerence between
yi and the nominal repayment ρi R(D). It hence is a function of four endogenous
variables, namely its risk level yi, its default premium ρi, its deposit volume di,a n d
the competitors’ deposit volume D−i =

k =i dk = D − di,
Πi(yi,ρ i,d i,D −i)=p(yi)[yi di − ρi R(di + D−i)di]=p(yi)di [yi − ρi R(D)]. (1)
Within this setting, we deﬁne two games characterized by the degrees of trans-
parency in the banking sector, modeled through diﬀerent time patterns of actions
and information revelation.22 In each game, we ﬁrst discuss the monopoly case with
n = 1. This yields insights into the banks’ incentives to take risks and expand
volume, abstracting from competitive eﬀects. These insights will be useful in the
subsequent analysis of the oligopoly case.
3.1 Opaque banks
In the ﬁrst model, depositors set the default premia ρ before banks choose their
deposit volumes d and their target returns y (see ﬁgure 1). This means that de-
positors cannot exert any market discipline because they cannot react to the actual
risk-taking of banks, which is revealed only after depositors have set the default pre-
mia. Therefore, we call banks opaque in this case. The model structure is equivalent
to a commitment problem, in which banks cannot commit to a particular risk level.
If there were a possibility for commitment or if the risk-taking of banks were con-
tractible, depositors could discipline banks by demanding default premia rising with
risk-taking. The given time structure generates a moral hazard problem between
depositors and banks, known as risk-shifting or asset substitution.23
20Depositors in our model should be thought of as investors who are not (fully) insured through
a deposit insurance scheme. Because of the risk neutrality of depositors, βi can also be interpreted
as the fraction of deposits that the government refunds in the case of bank failure.
21A relaxation of the exogeneity assumption is discussed in section 4.
22Similar time structures have been used by Matutes and Vives (2000).
23To give the market for deposits a micro foundation, assume that we have an auctioneer who
ﬁrst asks each inﬁnitesimal depositor j to report her individual supply function rj(D) for deposits,
and the default premium ρ
j
i she would demand from each bank i. We assume that depositors
are homogenous and name identical functions rj(D) and values ρ
j
i. The auctioneer aggregatesBanks without Parachutes 7
Figure 1: Time structure when banks are opaque
• For each bank i, the government announces a bail-out probability βi.
• Depositors (anticipating di and yi) set a default premium ρi.
• Banks choose di (anticipating yi), R(D) is determined in the deposit
market.
• Banks choose yi and invest.
• Projects mature and return yi with probability p(yi). Banks pay
ρi R(D) to their depositors if possible. Otherwise, the government
pays ρi R(D) with probability βi.
3.1.1 Monopoly
To abstract from competitive eﬀects, we ﬁrst look at the case with only one bank
(n = 1), so that D = d1. For readability, we omit all indices. As usual, we analyze









If a solution to (2) exists, it is unique given our assumptions on p(y).24 Thus the
















The intuition for the positive relationship between risk and deposit volume is straight-
forward. If d rises, ρR(d) goes up, and the bank compensates the shrinking margin















An increase in ρ reduces the margin, which is compensated for by raising the risk
level y.25 We now turn to the determination of the deposit volume. Banks choose d
the supply, R(D)=

rj(D)dj, and communicates supply and default premia to the banks. Now
each bank i chooses a volume di and communicates it to the auctioneer. Then the auctioneer
determines the aggregate deposit volume D =

i di and the risk-free market rate R(D), and he
ﬁxes the nominal deposit rate ρi R(D) for each bank.
24Below we will see cases where a solution does not exist for all β.
25Notice that both results are driven by the same mechanism, namely a decrease in the margin
that translates into an increase in risk. This mechanism is central to the “charter value literature”.Banks without Parachutes 8
given the default premium ρ and anticipating y. Incorporating the dependence of y
on d and ρ into the proﬁt function (1), the bank’s expected proﬁts are given by
Π=p(y(d,ρ))d[y(d,ρ) − ρR(d)]. (3)
The ﬁrst-order condition for this maximization problem yields an implicit relation
between d and ρ, which we denote by d(ρ). To keep our proofs tractable, we assume
from now on that R(d)a n dp(y) are linear functions.26 We can then derive the
following lemma.27
Lemma 1 (Optimal d for given ρ) The optimal deposit volume decreases in the
default premium, i.e., d (ρ) < 0.
As before, an increasing default premium reduces the margin y −ρR(d). The bank
can react by either increasing y or decreasing d. Lemma 1 implies that d decreases
in any case. This rules out the possibility that there is a strong increase in y,
accompanied by a weak increase in d.
Finally, we turn to the determination of ρ. Anticipating y and d, depositors set a
fair default premium ρ, so that they obtain an expected return of R(d), yielding
ρ =
1
p(y)+β (1 − p(y))
. (4)
The default premium ρ does not directly depend on d. However, there is an indirect
dependence through y. The resulting function ρ(d) is characterized by lemma 2.
Lemma 2 (Fair ρ for given d) The fair default premium increases in the deposit
volume, i.e., ρ (d) > 0.
The intuition for this result is as follows: An increase in d reduces the margin
y−ρR(d). The bank compensates for this reduction by increasing risk, inducing the
depositors to demand a higher default premium. The increase in ρ provokes further
risk-shifting, leading to a multiplier eﬀect, reinforcing the initial eﬀect. Hence, the
overall eﬀect on the default premium is positive.
In equilibrium, the default premium must be fair, given the anticipated deposit
volume, and the deposit volume has to be optimal, given the default premium.
Therefore, we can determine the equilibrium by looking at the intersection of the
two curves d(ρ)a n dρ(d). Figure 2 displays such equilibria for two diﬀerent bail-out
policies β, taking into account the results from lemmata 1 and 2. The following
proposition characterizes the eﬀects of diﬀerent bail-out policies on the equilibrium.
26This assumption is stronger than actually required. What we need is that R(d)a n dp(y)d o
not bend too much in the neighborhood of the equilibrium, so that they can be approximated
reasonably well by a ﬁrst-order Taylor-approximation.
27All proofs can be found in the appendix.Banks without Parachutes 9









This example is based on the functions p(y)=1−y and R(d)=d. For comparability,
the same functions are used throughout the paper.
Proposition 1 (Eﬀects of bail-out policy in monopoly) In an opaque monop-
olistic banking system, an increase in the bail-out probability induces depositors to
demand a lower default premium, ∂ρ/∂β < 0. The bank reacts by choosing a higher
deposit volume, ∂d/∂β > 0. It chooses a higher risk level (∂y/∂β > 0) if and only
if the supply of deposits is inelastic.
Figure 2 illustrates the ﬁrst part of this proposition. An increase in β implies that
depositors are compensated with a higher probability (or to a higher degree) when
there is a bank failure, which reduces the fair default premium for a given d; hence,
the function ρ(d) is shifted to the left. In contrast, d(ρ) does not depend on β
for a given ρ. From the graph, it is clear that in reaction to an increasing β,t h e
bank always expands and the default premium falls. The eﬀect on risk-taking is not
obvious, because the eﬀects of d and ρ on y go into opposite directions. Proposition 1
states that the overall eﬀect on risk-taking depends on the elasticity of the supply
of deposits. If the supply of deposits is elastic, the inverse function R(d) is inelastic.
Therefore, the expansion of the bank has only a small eﬀect on the deposit rate R(d).
As a result, the eﬀect working through ρ dominates the eﬀect working through d,
meaning that risk-taking actually decreases. If, on the other hand, the supply of
deposits is inelastic, R(d) is elastic, and an expansion of d leads to a large increase
in the deposit rate R(d). In this case, there is a clear tendency for banks to increase
risk. This ambiguous result contradicts the conventional wisdom according to which
a higher bail-out probability always leads to an increase in risk-taking.28
28In the example used in the ﬁgures, the elasticity of the deposit supply is equal to 1, so there is
no eﬀect on risk-taking in the monopoly case. The eﬀects on risk-taking observed in the oligopoly
case can hence be attributed to competitive eﬀects alone.Banks without Parachutes 10









The functions used for the graph are the same as in the monopoly. Here and in
the following graphs we consider an oligopoly with two banks. Black lines stand for
β1 = β2 =0 .1, the gray line for β1 =0 .13. The equilibria are indicated by dotted
lines. Notice that the increase in d1 is larger than the decrease in d2 so that aggregate
deposits increase.
3.1.2 Oligopoly
Assume now that n banks have been chartered instead of just one. We are interested
in how the market as a whole reacts when the government changes the bail-out policy
for one bank. Without a loss of generality, assume that the government raises the
bail-out probability β1 of bank 1.
Assume for the moment that the deposit volume D−1 of competitor banks is given.
Then proposition 1 implies that, just as in the monopoly case, the increase in β1
leads to a fall in the default premium ρ1. This induces bank 1 to increase its volume
d1. The question then is how bank 1’s behavior aﬀects the remaining banking sector.
In our model, banks interact only in the deposit market, namely through the deposit
rate R(D). In equilibrium, the deposit volume of each bank must be an optimal
reaction to the volume choices of all competitors. Lemma 3 summarizes the strategic
interactions in the deposit market.
Lemma 3 (Strategic interactions in the deposit market) The reaction func-
tion dj(D−j) of any bank j is a strictly decreasing function. Starting from an equi-
librium with positive deposit volumes at all banks, an outward shift of one bank’s
reaction function leads to an increase in that bank’s deposit volume and a decrease
in competitor banks’ deposit volumes. The former eﬀect dominates the latter, hence
aggregate deposits D increase.
The ﬁrst part of lemma 3 implies that deposit volumes are strategic substitutes in
our model. Figure 3 plots the reaction functions for a numerical example. FromBanks without Parachutes 11










Solid lines stand for bank 1, dashed lines for a competitor bank 2. In this example,
β2 =0 .25, so for β1 =0 .25, both banks are symmetric (gray vertical line).
proposition 1, we know that the reaction function of bank 1 shifts outward as β1
increases, while the reaction functions of the competitors remain unchanged. The
second part of lemma 3 implies that an increase in β1 leads to an expansion of
deposits at the subsidized bank and a contraction of deposits at the remaining
banks. Finally, the overall eﬀect is an expansion of the aggregate deposit volume.
This last point is crucial: It means that the market rate R(D) increases, implying
higher risk-taking by the competitor banks due to shrinking margins. The following
proposition sums up actions and reactions of bank 1 and its competitors.
Proposition 2 (Competitive eﬀects of bail-out policy) In an opaque banking
system, an increase in the bail-out probability β1 leads to
1. an expansion of deposits at bank 1 and a contraction of deposits at its com-
petitor banks j  =1 , ∂d1/∂β1 > 0 and ∂dj/∂β1 < 0;
2. an increase or decrease in risk at bank 1, depending on the elasticity of the
deposit supply; 29 in either case, the default premium falls, ∂ρ1/∂β1 < 0;
3. an increase in risk at the competitor banks j, accompanied by higher default
premia, ∂yj/∂β1 > 0 and ∂ρj/∂β1 > 0.
Proposition 2 is illustrated in ﬁgure 4 for a numerical example with two banks. As
the bail-out probability β1 rises, bank 1 raises its deposit volume. At the same time,
bank 2 is crowded out. Due to a lower nominal deposit rate ρ1 R(D), bank 1 reduces
29The risk-taking of bank 1 decreases if the supply of deposits is elastic (ε>1) or not too
inelastic (if ε<ε≤ 1 for some ε). Then there is an intermediate region (ε ≤ ε ≤ ε for some ε < ε)
where risk-taking may increase of decrease. If the deposit supply is very inelastic (if ε<ε ), bank 1
increases risk.Banks without Parachutes 12
its riskiness. For bank 2, the nominal rate rises, leading to higher risk-taking. If bail-
out policies become too asymmetric, the less protected bank’s incentives to take risk
become overwhelming, inducing depositors to demand ever higher default premia,
which in turn fuel risk-taking, so that the process reaches no new equilibrium. The
less protected bank closes. If there are only two banks initially, the other bank is
left with a monopoly as described in section 3.1.1. At that point, deposits at the
remaining bank jump up and risk-taking drops.
3.1.3 Welfare analysis










The ﬁrst term denotes the projects’ expected returns, summed up over all banks.
The second term gives the depositors’ opportunity costs, deﬁned by the integral over
the returns of opportunity investments. Banks’ expected repayments to depositors
are welfare-neutral, so they do not appear in (5). Similarly, the bail-out payments
from the government are welfare-neutral in our model.30
Welfare is aﬀected by three factors: risk-taking, the level of deposits, and the en-
trance or exit of banks. Since risk-taking is excessive in this model, an increase in
risk-taking always decreases welfare. An expansion of deposits of bank i increases
welfare as long as expected returns yi p(yi) outweigh opportunity costs R(D). In our
model, banks can grow excessively when they receive a subsidy via the protection. In
that case, an expansion of deposits reduces welfare. Finally, an asymmetric bail-out
policy may crowd out the least protected banks completely. Then risk-taking of all
other banks drops, aggregate deposits drop, and welfare may jump up or down. The
direction of the welfare jump depends on the relative impact of deposit contraction
and risk reduction.
Given the multitude of eﬀects going in diﬀerent directions, there is no clear prediction
about welfare eﬀects of bail-out policies. Already in the monopoly case, the welfare
eﬀects are ambiguous (see the dashed curve in ﬁgure 5). As stated in proposition 1,
an increase in β leads the protected bank to increase risk-taking if and only if the
deposit supply is inelastic. This tends to decrease welfare. A welfare increase due to
30In reality, there may be additional factors aﬀecting welfare. On the one hand, distortions
from taxation to ﬁnance bail-outs can be substantial. In that case, (5) overestimates welfare in the
presence of bail-outs, especially if bail-out probabilities are large. On the other hand, bail-outs may
be welfare-increasing ex post because they may help to avoid contagion and systemic crises. For a
full welfare assessment, all these eﬀects would have to be taken into account. Here we concentrate
on the (ex ante) welfare eﬀects of anticipated bail-outs.Banks without Parachutes 13
Figure 5: Aggregate welfare in the charter value model
Welfare
β1 β2 1 0
Duopoly Mon.→ Mon.
In this example, β2 =0 .25. For β1 =0 .25, both banks are symmetric (gray vertical
line). The dashed curve denotes welfare for the monopoly case, whereas the solid line
refers to an oligopoly with two banks.
mitigated risk-shifting occurs only if the deposit supply is elastic. In the example of
ﬁgure 5, risk-taking is constant at y =2 /3 because the elasticity is exactly 1. The
welfare increase observed for small β is entirely due to the expansion of deposits.
For large β, welfare declines due to excessive deposit growth: For β =1 ,R(d)=1 /3
whereas yp (y)=2 /9, so a marginal unit of deposits leads to a welfare loss of 1/9.
Because the bank still grows, welfare bends downwards for large β.
The oligopoly case is exempliﬁed by the solid curve with two discontinuities (see
ﬁgure 5). The mechanisms aﬀecting welfare are the same as above. However, in
the case of an oligopoly, the endogenous variables of diﬀerent banks inﬂuence each
other. If the β of diﬀerent banks are very asymmetric, the less protected bank will
not enter the market. In the example with just two banks, we end up back in the
monopoly case, with a high margin and little risk-taking (compare ﬁgure 4); welfare
jumps up in that case. As before, welfare decreases for very large β1 due to excessive
deposit growth. In the intermediate region, there are several countervailing eﬀects.
When β1 increases, bank 1 grows and reduces its risk-taking, whereas bank 2 shrinks
and increases risk. For relatively small β1, the welfare-decreasing eﬀects dominate,
while the opposite is true for larger β1. Overall it appears that some (but not too
much) asymmetry between banks enhances welfare.
One should be careful in drawing policy implications from this analysis. The analysis
restricts itself to the comparison of diﬀerent bail-out policies. However, there may
be alternative policies (e.g., the regulation of the number of banks, deposit rate
ﬂoors, direct subsidies for deposits) that may increase welfare with less detrimental
side-eﬀects on risk-shifting.Banks without Parachutes 14
Figure 6: Time structure when banks are transparent
• For each bank i, the government announces a bail-out probability βi
• Banks choose yi (anticipating di and ρi)
• Banks choose di, R(D) is determined in the deposit market
• yi is revealed, depositors set a default premium ρi,b a n k si n v e s t
• Projects mature and return yi with probability p(yi). Banks pay
ρi R(D) to their depositors if possible. Otherwise, the government
pays ρi R(D) with probability βi
3.2 Transparent banks
In our second model the time structure is reversed (see ﬁgure 6), so that depositors
observe banks’ risk choices before setting default premia. Here depositors can (and
do) exert market discipline. We call banks transparent in this case. In making their
risk choices, banks take into account that they are punished for excessive risk-taking.
Again the model could alternatively be phrased in terms of a commitment problem.
If banks could commit to a certain risk level or if risk-taking were contractible,
default premia would depend directly on the level of risk-taking, exerting discipline
on banks.
This disciplining eﬀect can be seen most clearly in the extreme case, where β =0 ,
i.e., the bank is never bailed out. In this case, depositors demand the fair premium
ρ =1 /p(y), and expected proﬁts of the bank are given by Π = d(yp (y) − R(D)).
Then the bank’s optimal y is equal to the ﬁrst-best solution because the bank itself
must bear the entire costs from excessive risk-taking. If β>0, there is again a
risk-shifting problem because the costs of the implicit government guarantee are not
borne by the bank.
3.2.1 Monopoly
Again, we start with the case of monopoly to abstract from competitive eﬀects.
First, we determine the fair default premium ρ, given the level of deposits d and the
bank’s risk choice y. The expression for ρ looks exactly the same as in (4),
ρ =
1
p(y)+β (1 − p(y))
. (6)
ρ increases in y and does not depend directly on d. Furthermore, it decreases in β.
In the extreme case, with β = 1, there is no default premium, independent of the
chosen risk level, i.e. ρ = 1. We can directly incorporate the fair default premium





p(y)+β (1 − p(y))
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Now there are only two endogenous variables left, y and d. First, we determine the
optimal level of deposits d for a given β and y,
∂Π
∂d






! =0 . (8)
An increase in d has two eﬀects: First, it increases proﬁts at a given margin; sec-
ond, it decreases the margin due to an increase in the deposit rate R(d). At the
optimum, these two eﬀects balance. If a solution to (8) exists, it is unique given our
assumptions on R(d). Thus the maximization yields an implicit function d(y), from
















One can distinguish two eﬀects: First, an increase in y directly increases the margin,
inducing the bank to expand its deposit volume. Second, there is an indirect eﬀect
working through ρ.Ar i s ei ny pushes up the default premium, and the corresponding
decrease in the margin leads to a countervailing eﬀect on d. The following lemma
states that the direct eﬀect dominates the indirect eﬀect. Again, we assume that
p(y)a n dR(d) are linear functions to keep the proofs manageable. Additionally, we
assume that β is small.31
Lemma 4 (Optimal d for given y) If β=0, then dy =0 ;a n di fβ>0,t h e n
dy > 0 in the neighborhood of the optimal y.
The intuition for this result is as follows: For any β, the bank will choose the highest
deposit volume when its expected return from the project is maximal. For β =0 ,
the bank’s risk choice coincides with the ﬁrst-best level of risk. Hence, the function
d(y) will have a maximum at the ﬁrst-best y,s ot h a tdy = 0 at this point; the
direct and the indirect eﬀect on d just cancel at this point. For β>0a n dy close
to the ﬁrst-best, the direct eﬀect on d is stronger than the indirect eﬀect since the
increase in ρ does not reﬂect the full increase in risk. Hence, the volume-maximizing
y will be larger than the ﬁrst-best, and the function d(y) will strictly increase in the
neighborhood of the ﬁrst-best risk level.32
In the ﬁnal step, we determine the bank’s optimal risk choice by taking the derivative
of the proﬁt function with respect to y. From this we get the implicit relation
p
 (y)d [y − ρ(y)R(d)] + p(y)d [1 − ρ
 (y)R(d)] = 0. (10)
31Some results are proven only in a neighborhood of β = 0 (which does not necessarily preclude
large β). Numerical calculations suggest that all of our results hold for β ∈ [0; 1].
32Figure A2 in the appendix shows the function d(y) for diﬀerent choices of β.Banks without Parachutes 16
An increase in y has two eﬀects: it decreases proﬁts through the success probability;
and it increases proﬁts through a rising margin. Again, these two eﬀects just balance











p  (y)[y − ρ(y)R(d)] + 2p (y)[1− ρ (y)R(d)] − p(y)ρ  (y)R(d)
. (11)
If a solution to the optimization problem exists, the denominator of this equation
is negative. In the numerator, we can distinguish two countervailing eﬀects: First,
ar i s ei nd mitigates the eﬀect of y working through the success probability, which
induces the bank to raise y. Second, an increase in d mitigates the eﬀect of y on the
margin, reducing the bank’s incentive to raise y. The following lemma states that
the ﬁrst eﬀect always dominates the second.
Lemma 5 (Optimal y for given d) If β =0 ,t h e nyd =0 ;a n di fβ>0,t h e n
yd > 0.
Intuitively, for β = 0, any increase in y is accompanied by a “fair” increase in ρ.T h e
bank therefore always opts for the ﬁrst-best risk level, which is constant. Hence the
two eﬀects add up to zero, and yd =0 .F o rβ>0, the increase in ρ is less than fair,
and the bank has an incentive to increase y above the ﬁrst-best level even if part of
the increase in returns is eaten up by the resulting rise in the default premium ρ(y).
The equilibria are given by the intersections of the curves d(y)a n dy(d). We are
interested in the reactions of the optimal y and d to a change in β.
First, we examine how the curve d(y) moves when β rises. At a given risk level
y,a ni n c r e a s ei nβ leads to a decrease in ρ. This induces the bank to expand its
deposit volume d. Hence, the curve d(y) shifts upwards. The movement of y(d)i s
somewhat more complicated: On the one hand, an increase in β lowers ρ and thus
reinforces the eﬀect working through the success probability. This induces the bank
to reduce y. On the other hand, an increase in β lowers the inﬂuence of y on the
default premium ρ,i .e . ,ρ (y) falls. Therefore, raising risk is less costly for the bank,
giving the bank an incentive to raise y. Hence, the movement of the curve is not
monotonous. One can show, however, that the second eﬀect dominates the ﬁrst one
for small β. The following proposition characterizes the eﬀect of an increase in the
bail-out probability on the equilibrium choices of y and d.
Proposition 3 (Eﬀects of bail-out policy in monopoly) In a transparent mo-
nopolistic banking system, an increase in the bail-out probability induces the bank to
raise its deposit volume d and choose a higher risk y. The default premium ρ de-
creases if R(d) is small enough.Banks without Parachutes 17
The monopolistic bank reacts to the subsidization by the government by expanding
its deposit volume and increasing risk because part of the potential losses can be
shifted to the government. With respect to ρ, there are two countervailing eﬀects:
the rise in β and the rise in y. Proposition 3 states that the eﬀect of the rising β
dominates for small R(d).
3.2.2 Oligopoly
Now we turn to the oligopoly case with n banks. Banks ﬁrst choose yi simultane-
ously; then they simultaneously take in deposits di.33 Analytically, we ﬁrst have to
solve the system of equations (∂Πi/∂di =0 ) i, i =1 ,...,n, and then in a second step
the system of equations (∂Πi/∂yi =0 ) i, i =1 ,...,n. As in section 3.1.2, assume
without loss of generality that the government raises β1.
The chain of reactions is almost identical to the one in section 3.1.2. There is a
direct eﬀect on bank 1, as described in proposition 3. Thereby, the rise in β1 leads
to an increase in bank 1’s risk and deposit volume, taking the deposit volumes of
competitors as given. As before, the behavior of bank 1 spills over to the other
banks through the deposit market. Lemma 6 describes the strategic interactions in
the deposit market.
Lemma 6 (Strategic interactions in the deposit market) The reaction func-
tion dj(D−j) of any bank j is a strictly decreasing function. Starting from an equi-
librium with positive deposit volumes at all banks, an outward shift of one bank’s
reaction function leads to an increase in that bank’s deposit volume and a decrease
in competitor banks’ deposit volumes. The former eﬀect dominates the latter, hence
aggregate deposits D increase.
This lemma is identical to lemma 3, and so are the mechanisms at work. As before,
deposit volumes are strategic substitutes. In fact, banks’ reactions functions look
like the ones in ﬁgure 3, with slightly diﬀerent slopes.34 Hence an increase in d1 is
again accompanied by a decrease in dj for j  = 1. The overall eﬀect on total deposits
is positive. As a result, the market rate rises, and competitors’ risk levels increase
accordingly. Proposition 4 summarizes the reactions of bank 1 and its competitors
to an increase in the bail-out probability of bank 1.
33Note that the competitor banks’ yi are revealed only after banks have decided on their deposit
volumes. As an alternative time structure, one may assume that banks can observe their mutual
risk choices when ﬁxing deposit volumes. In this case, banks will tend to choose higher risk levels for
strategic reasons: Since a bank’s optimal deposit volume rises with its exposure to risk, competitor
banks interpret increased risk-taking as a commitment to a high volume in the deposit market
afterwards. Numerical calculations suggest that our main results remain valid in this case.
34In the special case of R  (d) = 0, reaction functions are linear.Banks without Parachutes 18









Solid lines stand for bank 1, dashed lines for competitor bank 2. In this example,
β2 =0 .35, so for β1 =0 .35, both banks are identical.
Proposition 4 (Competitive eﬀects of bail-out policy) In a transparent bank-
ing system, an increase in the bail-out probability β1 leads to
1. an expansion of deposits at bank 1, and a contraction of deposits at its com-
petitor banks j  =1 ,i .e . ,∂d1/∂β1 > 0 and ∂dj/∂β1 < 0;
2. an increase in risk at bank 1, i.e. ∂y1/∂β1 > 0; the default premium decreases
if R(D) is small enough;
3. an increase in risk at the competitor banks j, accompanied by higher default
premia if βj > 0,i . e . ,∂yj/∂β1 > 0 and ∂ρj/∂β1 > 0;f o rβj =0 , yj and ρj
are constant.
The proposition is illustrated in ﬁgure 7 for the case of two banks. As the bail-out
probability β1 rises, bank 1 expands, while bank j is crowded out. Since the increase
in d1 is larger than the decrease in dj, the aggregate deposit volume increases, leading
t oah i g h e rm a r k e tr a t eR(D). As a result, the risk-shifting problem at bank j is
exacerbated. In the case of transparent banks, y1 also increases unambiguously.
Interestingly, the eﬀect of competition on risk-taking may be even stronger than the
direct eﬀect: For very large β1, y2 exceeds y1 in the numerical example.35
The most important result is that the competitive eﬀects of the bail-out policy on
the remaining banking sector are independent of the time and information structure
of the model: In both of our models, the subsidized bank expands, causing a rise in
the market rate, which aggravates the risk-shifting problems at competitor banks.
35To demonstrate this possibility, we chose a diﬀerent β2 in the graphs than in the model with
opaque banks. For β2 =0 .25, the two curves just touch at β1 =1 .Banks without Parachutes 19
3.2.3 Welfare analysis
The welfare measure in the transparent banking system is the same as in the opaque
system (see (5)). The mechanisms at work are also very similar. The increase in
risk-taking at all banks clearly decreases welfare in this model. The eﬀect of an
expansion of deposits is again ambiguous because deposit growth can be excessive.
This introduces some ambiguity about the overall welfare eﬀects. Finally, less pro-
tected banks may leave the market if asymmetries become too large.36
First, consider the monopoly case. For β = 0, the level of risk is ﬁrst best, but
the deposit volume is suboptimally low. An increase in β increases risk-taking and
hence reduces welfare, but it also induces the monopolist bank to expand, which
increases welfare as long as yp (y) exceeds R(d). Either of the eﬀects may dominate.
For large β, deposit growth is likely to be excessive; then both eﬀects point in the
same direction, and welfare decreases unambiguously. The dashed curve in ﬁgure 8
shows an example where welfare increases for small β, but decreases for large β.
In the oligopoly, welfare tends to decrease. Only if the number of banks is low can
the welfare gain due to the deposit expansion of bank 1 outweigh the welfare losses
due to excessive risk-taking, at least for small β. The larger the number of banks, the
closer the banking system is to being competitive. If βi = 0 for all i,a n dn is large,
the level of aggregate deposits is close to the eﬃcient level, and expected returns of
the projects are nearly equal to reﬁnancing rates, so that yi p(yi) ≈ R(D). Therefore,
little is to be gained from a deposit expansion. Even for the duopoly case, the scope
for welfare gains may be limited, as is apparent from the solid curve in ﬁgure 8,
which rises only slightly for small β1. If the economy is suﬃciently competitive
(n ≥ 3 in our example), welfare decreases even for small β in the oligopoly.
4 Conclusion
We started from the question of how government bail-out policies aﬀect competition
in the banking sector. While the existing literature has focused on the eﬀects of
bail-out policies on the bank that enjoys the public guarantee, we are interested in
the competitive eﬀects of such policies on the remaining banking sector.
We have presented two models, diﬀering only with respect to their time and informa-
tion structures. In the ﬁrst model, with opaque banks, risk-taking is unobservable by
depositors; so there is no market discipline. Therefore, a bank’s risk choice does not
directly aﬀect its reﬁnancing costs. In the second model, with transparent banks,
investments are perfectly observable, and depositors exert market discipline. As a
consequence, deposit rates react promptly to a bank’s risk choice.
36However, the exit of banks is more likely to occur in the opaque setting due to the multiplier
eﬀect explained above.Banks without Parachutes 20




In this example, β2 =0 .35. The dashed curve denotes welfare for the monopoly case,
whereas the solid curve refers to an oligopoly with two banks.
Our main contribution has been in showing that an increase in the bail-out prob-
ability of one bank unambiguously leads to an increase in the risk-taking of the
competitor banks. At the same time, competitor banks are crowded out. In con-
trast, the eﬀect on the protected bank’s risk-taking depends, among other things,
on the degree of transparency in the banking system. If banks are opaque, the pro-
tected bank may take less risk, while it always assumes more risk in a transparent
environment. This adds a qualiﬁcation to the existing literature, which suggests
that an increase in the bail-out probability always leads to higher risk-taking at the
protected bank. As a direct consequence, the welfare eﬀects of raising the bail-out
probability are ambiguous. Welfare may increase or decrease, depending on the
transparency of the banking system, the degree of competition within the system,
the degree of protection, and the asymmetry of banks.
The competitive eﬀects are particularly strong in the opaque setting. This is due
to the multiplier eﬀect, which reinforces the original eﬀect of risk-taking on the
default premium through the feedback from the default premium on risk-taking.
If protected banks do not take higher risk, this simply indicates that the banking
system is rather opaque, implying that competitor banks are especially exposed to
increased risk-taking. This would be anything but reassuring.
There are a number of interesting extensions to our paper. One of the most im-
portant issues is the assumed exogeneity of the bail-out probability. In the case of
public banks, one can reasonably argue that the bail-out probability is exogenous.
In contrast, in the case of a “too-big-to-fail” policy, the bail-out probability should
depend on the size of banks. By allowing the bail-out probability to depend on size,
we get an additional strategic eﬀect. Since high bail-out probabilities are beneﬁcial
for banks, a strategic tendency towards increased volume develops. This raises the
deposit rate, exacerbating the risk-shifting problem.Banks without Parachutes 21
Another issue concerns the chosen market structure. In our model, banks only
interact in the market for deposits, and this interaction is modelled in a Cournot
fashion. One may change the market structure of our model in two ways. First,
competition in the market for deposits may be modelled as price competition with
product diﬀerentiation or transportation costs.37 We believe that, if this is done, our
central result remains valid, so that competitor banks are still pushed towards higher
risk-taking. Suppose, for example, that banks are located on a Salop circle and that
the bail-out probability of one bank increases. The direct eﬀect is a decrease in the
default premium of the protected bank, leading to cheaper reﬁnance opportunities.
As a reaction, the protected bank will expand. Neighboring banks ﬁnd themselves
threatened by the competition from the protected bank and may react by increasing
their deposit rates to regain some “territory” and move away from the protected
banks. This eﬀect spills over to the neighbors of the neighbors and so forth. In
equilibrium, all competitor banks lose some territory and increase their deposit
rates; this is accompanied by higher risk-taking.
Second, competition may take place in the market for loans, and not only in the
deposit market. In this case, it is less clear that our main result is still valid. In fact,
Boyd and De Nicol` o (2004) have shown that the main eﬀect driving the “charter-
value” literature – and our model – disappears, once one simultaneously introduces
competition in deposit and loan markets. However, there are a number of diﬀerent
ways to introduce competition into the loan market. We conjecture that the results
would depend on the exact model speciﬁcation.
Our model also has a normative implication: governments should refrain from bail-
out policies, especially in transparent banking markets. The overall welfare eﬀects
of such policies are highly ambiguous, and the eﬀects on the competitor banks
are always detrimental. Only the subsidized bank stands to proﬁt, at the cost
of the increased instability in the remaining banking sector. Regulatory initiatives
aiming at greater transparency should be accompanied by a “zero bail-out policy”.38
Market transparency and government intervention are substitutes for one another,
they should never prevail at the same time.
37This has been done by Matutes and Vives (2000) and Cordella and Yeyati (2002), however
without considering government bail-outs.
38Our results are independent of whether the government does in fact bail out some banks, or
whether markets only expect the government to do so. Since the negative impact arises from the
expectations of market participants, the government should try to build up a reputation of being
committed to a “zero bail-out policy”.Banks without Parachutes 22
A Appendix
A.1 Proofs for opaque banks
A.1.1 Monopoly
Proof of lemma 1: In the monopoly D = d. R(d)a n dp(y) are assumed to be
linear, so we can write
p(y)=p0 − p1 y, (A1)
R(d)=R0 + R1 d. (A2)
We derive the function y(d,ρ) by taking the derivative of proﬁts with respect to y
and solving for y:
∂Π
∂y
= d(p0 − p1 y)+dp 1 (y − ρ(R0 + R1 d))
! =0 ,
y(d,ρ)=
p0 + p1 (R0 + R1 d)ρ
2p1
. (A3)
Plugging this function into the proﬁt function yields
Π=
d(p0 − p1 (R0 + R1 d)ρ)2
4p1
. (A4)





(p0 − p1 (R0 + dR 1)ρ)(p0 − p1 (R0 +3dR 1)ρ)
4p1
! =0 . (A5)



















 =3β +( 1− β)p0 > 0.
Hence, the derivative d (ρ) is negative. 
Proof of lemma 2: The equation that determines ρ is
ρ =
1
p(y)+β (1 − p(y))
⇐⇒ ρ[p(y)+β (1 − p(y))] − 1=0 . (A6)Banks without Parachutes 23
The default premium ρ depends only indirectly on the deposit volume d.T od e r i v e
ρ (d), we take the derivative of equation (A6) with respect to d, considering that
y = y(d,ρ(d)), and we solve for ρ (d),
0=ρ
 (d)[p(y)+β (1 − p(y))] + ρy ρ ρ
 (d)p

















There are two indirect eﬀects through which d aﬀects ρ. First, an increase in d leads
t oar i s ei nR(d), which induces the bank to raise y; this reduces p(y), so depositors
demand a higher ρ. This eﬀect can be seen from the numerator in (A7). Second, this
increase in ρ induces the bank to raise y even further, leading to a further increase
in ρ. This multiplier eﬀect is embodied in the denominator of (A7). Both eﬀects
point in the same direction. Because the denominator is smaller than 1, the whole
fraction is greater than the numerator alone. If the denominator converges towards
0, risk becomes so large that it cannot be compensated by a ﬁnite ρ. Hence in the
area of well-deﬁned ρ,w eh a v eρ (d) > 0. 
Proof of proposition 1: In lemma 1, we have already shown that ρ(d) is a strictly
increasing function. Lemma 2 states that d(ρ) is strictly decreasing. Now we are
interested in how these curves shift in the (ρ,d)-space when β increases (see ﬁgure 2).
As can be seen from (A5), d(ρ) does not depend on β.F o rρ(d), we determine the
direction of the shift by taking the derivative of (A6) with respect to β,
0=ρ





p(y)+β (1 − p(y))
= −
1 − p(y)
(p(y)+β (1 − p(y)))2 < 0. (A8)
This implies a leftward shift of the function ρ(d). From these results we can conclude
directly that ∂ρ/∂β < 0a n d∂d/∂β > 0 (see again ﬁgure 2), which proves the ﬁrst
part of the proposition.
The eﬀect of β on y is not immediately clear, because the increase in d leads to
ah i g h e ry, whereas the decrease in ρ reduces y. To analyze the eﬀect on y,w e
explicitly calculate the equilibrium from equation (A5) and equation (A6), after
plugging in the expression for y from (A3).











2 − 12(1 − β)p1 R0
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where  > 0i sd e ﬁ n e da sa b o v e . A1
Substituting d and ρ as given in (A9) and (A10) into y(d,ρ)f r o m( A 3 )a n dt a k i n g
the derivative with respect to β,w eg e t
y =
5 − 12β +

2 − 12(1 − β)p1 R0





2p1 R0 (1 − β) −  +

2 − 12(1 − β)p1 R0
2p1 (1 − β)2 
2 − 12(1 − β)p1 R0
.
This derivative changes signs in two cases: for p0 =3+p1 R0 and for R0 =0 .
p0 < 3+p1 R0 as long as p(y) < 1, hence we need to look only at the case where
R0 =0 .F o rR0 < 0, ∂y/∂β is positive, whereas for R0 > 0, it is negative. We can
interpret this ﬁnding in terms of elasticities. We have















We see that the elasticity ε is smaller than one if R0 is negative, implying that risk
increases with rising β in that case (and vice versa). 
A.1.2 Oligopoly
Proof of lemma 3: We ﬁrst show that a bank’s deposit volume shrinks as com-
petitors’ deposit volumes expand. We derive the function yj(D,ρj)j u s ta si nt h e
monopoly case and plug it into the proﬁt function,
yj(D,ρj)=




dj (p0 − p1 (R0 + R1 D)ρj)2
4p1
.













j − 12(1 − βj)p1 (R0 + D−j R1)
, where
j =3βj +( 1− βj)p0.
A1This algebraic solution is subject to the constraints that d must not be negative and that
p(y(d,ρ)) must not exceed 1.Banks without Parachutes 25







Black lines stand for D−j = 0, gray lines for D−j =1 /30.
One can show that dj(ρj) is again strictly decreasing in the (ρj,d j)-space, and ρj(dj)
strictly increasing. When D−j grows, both curves shift downwards, as depicted in















j − (1 − βj)12p1 (R0 + D−j R1),
which proves our ﬁrst assertion.
We have shown that an increase in the deposit volume of one bank is accompanied
by a decrease in deposits at the competitor banks. We now show that the aggregate
eﬀect on deposits is positive. The initial equilibrium levels of deposits are denoted
by d∗
1,...,d ∗
n.W h e n β1 rises marginally, equilibrium levels adjust to d∗∗
1 ,...,d ∗∗
n .
We have already shown that the direct eﬀect of the rise of β1 is an expansion of
d1, and that this leads to a contraction of d2,...,d n. However, this contraction will
never overcompensate the increase in d1:W h e nd2,...,d n contract so much that
the original D∗ is reached again, for each bank j  =1 ,t h ec h o i c ed∗
j would again be
optimal, contradicting the fact that deposit volumes have decreased. Since bank 1’s
deposit volume rises in any case, D has to expand.
As shown above, the contraction of d2,...,d n leads to a further expansion of d1,
which again entails a further contraction of d2,...,d n. Eventually, this convergence
process comes to an end. Possibly, dj = 0 for some j ∈{ 2,...,n}. The contrac-










j for all j ∈{ 2...,n}, and D
∗∗ >D
∗,Banks without Parachutes 26
which proves our second assertion. 
Proof of proposition 2: The direct eﬀects of an increase in β1 on bank 1 are as
in the monopoly case: ρ1 declines and d1 rises. The eﬀect on risk-taking y1 again
depends on the supply elasticity of deposits. However, the elasticity of individual
supply is larger than that of aggregate supply. The individual elasticity of bank 1




















Hence the protected bank increases risk only if the aggregate supply elasticity of
deposits is lower, and possibly considerably lower, than one.
T h er i s ei nd1 leads to a decrease in dj (for j  = 1), as was shown in lemma 3.
Bank 1 reacts by increasing its deposit volume even further, and so on. To assess
the indirect eﬀects on risk-taking and default premia, we have to analyze how the
default premium ρi and risk yi react to an increase in D−i. Using the same procedure




36p1 R1 (1 − βi)







where   is deﬁned as above. Hence a decrease in the competitor banks’ deposit
volumes reinforces the direct eﬀect on ρ1, and tends to reduce y1. For the competitor
banks, the default premia and the risk-taking of banks j  = 1 increase in reaction to
t h er i s ei nd1. Again these eﬀects are reinforced by indirect eﬀects. This completes
the proof of proposition 2. 
A.2 Proofs for transparent banks
A.2.1 Monopoly
Proof of lemma 4: Substituting for ρ(y)i n( 9 ) ,w eg e t
dy =
β +( 1− β)[p(y)+yp  (y)]
2R (d)+dR   (d)
=
β +( 1− β)[p(y)+yp  (y)]
2R (d)





and dy = 0 for β =0 ,w h i c hw a st ob es h o w n . Banks without Parachutes 27
Figure A2: Risk level and deposit volume for varying β in the monopoly
y







Equilibria (i.e., intersections of curves pertaining to the same β) are denoted by the
solid black curve.
Figure A2 displays d(y) for varying β. As predicted, d(y) increases in the neighbor-
hood of the ﬁrst-best solution; it is locally constant only for β =0 .
Proof of lemma 5: The equation deﬁning y(d) implicitly is
0=[ p(y)+yp
 (y)][p(y)+β (1 − p(y))]
2 − βp
 (y)R(d). (A14)
Taking the derivative with respect to d and assuming linear p(y) yields
0=yd [2p
 (y)+yp
  (y)][p(y)+β (1 − p(y))]
2
+[ p(y)+yp
 (y)]2(1− β)yd p









 (y)][p(y)+β (1 − p(y))]
2
+[ p(y)+yp
 (y)]2(1− β)yd p








Solving for yd and assuming that β is small and hence p(y)+yp  (y) ≈ 0, we get
yd =
βR  (d)
2[p(y)+β (1 − p(y))]2.
If β>0, yd > 0; if β =0 ,yd=0, which was to be proven. 
Figure A2 displays the function y(d) for diﬀerent choices of β. y(d)i n c r e a s e si nd if
β>0; it is globally constant if β =0 .
Proof of proposition 3: We have shown in lemmata 4 and 5 that the functions
d(y)a n dy(d) are strictly increasing for small β. From the lemmata, we also knowBanks without Parachutes 28
what the two curves look like for β =0 :y(d) is a vertical line at the ﬁrst-best risk
choice, and d(y) is locally ﬂat around the ﬁrst-best y (see ﬁgure A2). We now show
how these curves move in the (y,d)-space when β increases. Then we analyze the
corresponding changes in the equilibrium values of y and d.
We ﬁrst show that, ceteris paribus, the deposit volume d increases as β increases.
Substituting ρ in (8) and taking the derivative with respect to β yields
0=y (p(y)+β (1 − p(y))) − R(d) − dR
 (d),
0=y (1 − p(y)) − dβ (2R
 (d)+dR
  (d)).
For linear R(d), we get
dβ =
y (1 − p(y))
2R (d)
> 0.
Hence the curve d(y) shifts upwards in the (y,d)-space (see ﬁgure A2). Next, we
show that the curve y(d) shifts to the right as β rises. Applying the same procedure
as above to (10), we get
0=[ p(y)+yp





  (y)][p(y)+β (1 − p(y))]
2
+[ p(y)+yp




  (y)yβ]. (A16)
If p(y) is linear and if β is not too large, so that p(y)+yp  (y) ≈ 0, (A16) simpliﬁes
to




2[p(y)+β (1 − p(y))]2 > 0. (A17)
The changes in equilibrium values follow directly. Our ﬁndings imply that the curves
y(d)a n dd(y) look as depicted in ﬁgure A2: Both curves are increasing, and y(d)
is steeper than d(y) for small β. Shifting the two curves in the directions described
above yields the desired result: both y and d must increase in equilibrium when β
goes up.
The eﬀect on ρ remains to be shown. ρ falls if [p(y)+β (1−p(y))] rises. Therefore,
we examine
∂[p(y)+β (1 − p(y))]
∂β
= yβ p
 (y)+( 1− p(y)) − βy β p
 (y)
=1− p(y)+( 1− β)yβ p
 (y)
=1− p(y)+( 1− β)
p (y)R(d)
2[p(y)+β (1 − p(y))]2
β≈0
≈ 1 − p(y) −
R(d)
2yp (y)
.Banks without Parachutes 29













This ﬁgure is analogous to ﬁgure A1. The solid black curve shows the equilibria (i.e.,
the intersections of curves pertaining to the same D−j).
This is positive whenever R(d) is small enough,
R(d) < (1 − p(y))(2yp (y)). (A18)
Note that this condition applies to the case where β is small and y close to the ﬁrst-
best case. For larger β, (A18) may be overly restrictive. In numerical calculations
(e.g., in the example p(y)=1−y and R(d)=d), ρ rises with β globally, even when
(A18) does not hold. 
A.2.2 Oligopoly
Proof of lemma 6: In order to derive the slope of the banks’ reaction functions, we
have to consider the simultaneous reactions of the optimal yj and dj to an increase
in the competitors’ deposit volume D−j. The curves dj(yj)a n dyj(dj) are displayed
in ﬁgure A2. It can be shown that both curves move downwards in the (yj,d j)-space
as D−j rises. This implies that in principle yj and dj could go up or down when
competitors’ deposits increase. However, as the following calculations will show, yj
unambiguously increases, whereas dj decreases.





p(yj)+βj (1 − p(yj))

+ R(dj + D−j)+dj R








p(yj)+βj (1 − p(yj))
2 − βj p
 (yj)R(dj + D−j).
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Generally, if we have two equations, F(y,d, )=0a n d ˜ F(y,d, ) = 0, that implicitly




Fy ˜ F  − F  ˜ Fy
Fd ˜ Fy − Fy ˜ Fd
.
























This proves the ﬁrst part of the lemma.
We still have to show that the aggregate eﬀect on deposits is positive. The argument
here is completely analogous to the one used in the proof of lemma 3, and is therefore
skipped. This completes the proof. 
Proof of proposition 4: Lemma 6 states that competitors react to an expansion of
d1 by contracting dj. From the point of view of bank 1, the interest rate on the
deposit market can be described by a function ˜ R(d1), which incorporates the other
banks’ reactions to bank 1’s behavior. Since D is larger in the new equilibrium (cf.
lemma 6), ˜ R(d1) has a positive slope, just as R(D). Therefore, the results for bank 1
from proposition 4 follow directly from proposition 3 if one replaces R(d)w i t h ˜ R(d).
Hence y1 and d1 increase, whereas ρ1 decreases (for ˜ R(d1) small enough).
From the point of view of the competitor banks, an increase in β1 is equivalent to a
rise in D−j. Therefore, the reaction of dj is already described by lemma 6. Using a




Fd ˜ F  − F  ˜ Fd



















as long as β>0. Hence yj increases in reaction to the increase in d1.I f β =0 ,
risk-taking does not change at all; in that case, competitor banks always choose
the ﬁrst-best risk level, independent of other banks’ behavior. The reaction of ρj is
obvious. Because the risk level yj rises and βj remains constant, the default premium
ρj must also rise. This completes the proof of the proposition. Banks without Parachutes 31
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